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STRANGERS WITH OUR FACES: HOW THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT CAN PREVENT 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STUNTS 
Ericka H. Spears* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ha Ha Ha!1  Walking into your office, you are greeted by snickering 
co-workers.  Worried that you have something stuck in your teeth, you 
quickly rush to the restroom where you are greeted by your best friend 
who says, “Wow, I really thought you told me everything, I didn’t know 
you were into swinging!”  Thoroughly confused at this point, you ask, 
“What are you talking about?”  She responds, “Everyone has seen you 
on AdultFriendFinder.com.”  You have never heard of this website, let 
alone registered on it.  After several minutes of awkward silence, your 
friend notices your utter confusion, and says, “Why don’t I show you 
what everyone is talking about.” 
Ten minutes later, you are horrified to discover a profile featuring a 
digitally altered image of yourself, which you have never seen.  The 
profile features your actual hometown, hair color, eye color, and height–
enough information to lead anyone who knew you to believe that the 
profile was yours.  However, this is where the similarities stop.  The 
profile is filled with details about what you are looking for in a partner 
as well as your sexual habits and proclivities, none of which are true.  If 
this was not enough, suddenly your office phone rings and your boss 
asks to speak with you.  A sinking feeling settles in the pit of your 
stomach as you walk to his office. 
“Fired!”  Your world has suddenly been turned upside down.  This 
morning you were an average employee, but now your reputation and 
career are ruined because a stranger used your image on an adult 
website.  You try to recover from the damage this posting caused your 
commercial value by bringing a claim for misappropriation of the right 
of publicity, but the judge tells you that your claim is barred by a statute 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank God and her parents, Virgil and Patricia Spears, for their continued love and support. 
 1. This hypothetical is based on the situations faced by the Plaintiffs in Doe v. Friendfinder 
Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) and Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 
2003).  The Plaintiffs in both cases were women who had total strangers use their identity on websites 
and were then left to face the repercussions. 
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that protects the interests of operators and users of interactive computer 
services.2 
Real plaintiffs have suffered this injustice, by being precluded from 
bringing right of publicity claims under Section 230 (§ 230) of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA).3 
This Comment examines the various approaches applied by federal 
circuits regarding whether the immunity from tort liability granted by 
§ 230 to operators and users of interactive computer services4 that 
publish information provided by a third party applies to Internet content 
providers, such as Internet dating sites, facing liability for the tort of 
misappropriation of the right of publicity.  Part II of this Comment 
discusses the history of both the Communications Decency Act and the 
state law of the right of publicity.  Part III explores the current split 
among the federal circuits regarding whether § 230 permits state law 
claims for misappropriation of the right of publicity.  Part IV argues 
right of publicity claims should be exempt from § 230 immunity based 
on the right of publicity’s traditional characterization as an intellectual 
property claim, the strict statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2), and the 
public policy interests of state law makers in developing right of 
publicity law and Congress in passing § 230.  Finally, in Part V, this 
Comment joins the First Circuit in classifying the right of publicity as an 
intellectual property right exempt from CDA immunity. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An overview of the CDA and an introduction to the right of publicity 
provide the background information necessary to fully understand the 
context in which courts interpret § 230.  Subpart A of this Part discusses 
the policy considerations taken into account by Congress when passing 
§ 230 of the CDA.  Subpart B discusses the history and policy behind 
the right of publicity and how to bring a cause of action for the 
 2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”).  “Most 
courts have held that through these provisions, Congress granted interactive services of all types, 
including blogs, forums, and listservs, immunity from tort liability so long as the information is provided 
by a third party.”  Citizen Media Law Project, Immunity for Online Publishers Under the 
Communications Decency Act, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishers-
under-communications-decency-act (last visited June 5, 2010). 
 3. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).  “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  Id. 
 4. See id. 
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misappropriation of the right of publicity. 
A. Legislative History of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
The CDA was originally passed to regulate obscenity and indecency 
on the Internet.5  Section 230, which protects users and operators of 
interactive computer services from liability for content posted by third 
parties, was not part of the original Senate legislation, but was added in 
a conference with the House of Representatives.6  This provision was 
passed in part as a reaction to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co., a controversial New York Supreme Court decision which held that 
online service providers could be held liable for the speech of their 
users.7 
An unidentified user of Prodigy’s Money Talk bulletin board created 
a post which claimed that Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities 
investment banking firm and its president, committed fraudulent and 
criminal acts in connection with an initial public offering of stock.8  
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy, arguing that Prodigy should be liable as 
the publisher of the defamatory material.9  Despite Prodigy’s reliance on 
the district court’s prior decision in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,10 
which found that an Internet service provider was not liable as a 
publisher for user-generated content, the court held that Prodigy was 
liable as the publisher of the content created by its users because it 
exercised editorial control over the messages on its bulletin boards.11 
 5. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 560–61 (1996). 
 6. Tara E. Lynch, Good Samaritan or Defamation Defender? Amending the Communications 
Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of Section 230 . . . Without Expanding ISP Liability, 19 
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 8 (2008).  “The original Senate version of the CDA included only 
the prohibitions against and penalties for distributing obscene material over the Internet to minors, and 
did not include section 230, which was added by conference amendment in the House of 
Representatives.”  Id. 
 7. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, 
§ 230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2006)).  “The amendment 
[Section 230], proposed by Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-CA), came as 
a direct response to the New York decisions Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Services.  Specifically, the amendment statutorily overruled the then-recent Stratton Oakmont 
decision, which had held an ISP could be held liable for defamatory material posted by its users.”  
Lynch, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 8. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 11. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.  The New York court found that Prodigy 
exercised editorial control over the messages on its bulletin boards in three ways: 1) posting Content 
Guidelines for users, 2) enforcing those guidelines through “Board Leaders” and 3) utilizing screening 
software designed to remove offensive language.  Id. at *4–5. 
3
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The decision in Stratton Oakmont had a potential chilling effect, 
leaving “providers of interactive computer services with the choice of 
either monitoring and editing posts by third parties and therefore 
accepting some liability for the content of the postings, or not 
monitoring any posts by third parties no matter how objectionable the 
content, thereby avoiding liability.”12  Congress acknowledged this 
dilemma motivated the creation of § 230,13 which states that “no 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”14  Through this provision Congress granted most 
internet service providers immunity from liability for publishing false or 
defamatory material so long as it was provided by another party.15 
Congress enacted § 230 for two basic policy reasons: to promote the 
free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to 
encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.16  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed these policy concerns in 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., a case concerning the posting of 
offensive messages regarding the Oklahoma City Bombing on an 
America Online (AOL) bulletin board, and holding that AOL, as an 
internet service provider, was immune from liability under § 230.17  The 
Fourth Circuit addressed the chilling effect on speech that may result 
from holding internet service providers liable as publishers and 
expresses a fear that internet service providers “might choose to severely 
restrict the number and type of messages posted” in order to avoid being 
faced with potential liability for each message republished by their 
services.18  The court addressed the encouragement of voluntary 
monitoring for offensive material, noting that Congress enacted § 230’s 
broad immunity “to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents 
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
 12. Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It That Non-Celebrity Gossip Website Operators 
are Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 821, 831 (2009). 
 13. Cybertelecom: Good Samaritan Reference 47 U.S.C. § 230, http://www.cybertelecom.org/ 
cda/samaritanref.htm (last visited May 21, 2010). 
 14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).  “The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3). 
 15. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003).  An “internet service provider” 
is “[a] business that offers Internet access through a subscriber’s phone line, usually charging the user 
for the time spent connected to the business’s server.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 16. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026–30. 
 17. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 18. Id. at 331. 
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Congress even codified its policy reasons for passing § 230 within the 
language of the statute itself.  Section 230(b) states that: 
It is the policy of the United States – (1) to promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the 
Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous 
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.20 
In summary, in order to counteract the negative implications of the 
Stratton Oakmont decision, which held that online service providers 
could be held liable for the speech of their users, Congress enacted § 230 
of the CDA.  Congress had two goals in mind when immunizing users 
and operators of interactive computer services from liability for content 
posted by third parties: to promote the free exchange of information and 
ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for 
offensive material. 
B. The Right of Publicity: Where Intellectual Property Law Meets Torts 
The right of publicity is “a right inherent to everyone to control the 
commercial use of identity and persona and recover in court damages 
and the commercial value of an unpermitted taking.”21  The right of 
publicity shares aspects of property law and of tort law.  From the 
plaintiff’s perspective, the right of publicity is intellectual property 
capable of being “licensed” and “trespassed upon.”22  However, from 
the defendant’s perspective, infringement on the right of publicity is a 
tort of unfair competition developed from the tort of priv 23
In order to understand how the right of publicity became a “mixture 
of personal rights, property rights, and rights under the law of unfair 
 19. Id. 
 20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). 
 21. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS of PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2009). 
 22. Id. § 1:7. 
 23. Id. 
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competition,”24 an exploration of its history and policy is necessary.  
This Subpart first discusses the historical development of the right of 
publicity from its origins in the right of privacy to its recognition as an 
independent doctrine.  Second, this Subpart explores the public policy 
reasons for having a right of publicity in state law.  Finally, this Subpart 
discusses the development of the cause of action for the 
misappropriation of the right of publicity. 
1. Historical Development of Right of Publicity Law 
The right of publicity, a state-created intellectual property right, is 
defined as “the inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”25  This right developed within the 
domain of privacy law, specifically the right “to be let alone.”26  
However, the right “to be let alone” only applied in cases where 
anonymous persons saw their identities used without permission in 
widely circulated advertisements.27  The right “to be let alone” did not 
directly address the issue of how celebrities could prevent the 
unauthorized commercial use of their image.28  Therefore, the 
boundaries of the law of privacy were stretched when “famous 
plaintiffs” began to appear in court, arguing not that they wanted no one 
to commercialize their identity, but that they wanted the right to control 
when, where, and how their identity was used.29 
Finally, in 1953, Judge Jerome Frank recognized that the law needed 
an alternative view of the right to control the commercial use of one’s 
identity, and the new label, the “right of publicity,” was born in the case 
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum.30  In Haelan, the 
plaintiff, a chewing gum distributor, who signed a contract with baseball 
players for an exclusive right to use their pictures on advertising, sued 
the defendant, claiming that the defendant invaded plaintiff’s exclusive 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. § 1:3. 
 26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890). 
 27. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 1:7. 
 28. Id. § 1:38.  “Well known personalities . . . do not seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ which 
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect.”  Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203–04 (1954) (quoting Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 196 (1890)).  “Indeed, privacy is the one thing they do ‘not want, or need.’”  Id. at 204 
(quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 361 (1952)).  “[T]he well known personality does not 
wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph, and 
likeness reproduced and publicized without his consent or without remuneration to him.”  Id. 
 29. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 5:63 to 5:67. 
 30. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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right to use the photographs by inducing the players to allow their image 
to be used on defendant’s competing chewing gum.31  Judge Frank 
recognized that in addition to the right of privacy, persons have a “right 
of publicity” in their photographs, which in this case meant each 
baseball player’s right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture.32 
The Supreme Court first addressed the right of publicity in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., a case in which a performer brought 
an action against a television broadcasting company to recover damages 
allegedly suffered when the broadcasting company videotaped his entire 
performance and played the videotape on a television news program 
without his consent.33  The Court held that “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not immunize the [news] media [from civil liability] 
when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent,” and 
that the Constitution does not prevent a state from requiring broadcasters 
to compensate performers.34  The Court found that “the broadcast of a 
film of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic 
value of that performance,” because “if the public can see the act free on 
television it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair,” and the 
broadcast “goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an 
entertainer.”35  Furthermore, the Court stated that protecting the 
petitioner’s right of publicity “provides an economic incentive for him to 
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the 
public.”36  Though “entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First 
Amendment protection,” and “entertainment itself can be important 
news,” “neither the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit 
of petitioner’s performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is 
appropriately recognized.”37  Therefore the court in Zacchini not only 
 31. Id. at 867. 
 32. Id. at 869. 
 33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  The plaintiff “perform[ed] a 
15-second ‘human cannonball’ act in which he [was] shot from cannon into a net some 200 feet away.”  
Id. at 562.  The plaintiff asked a freelance reporter who attended the fair where he performed not to film 
the performance.  The freelance reporter “returned the following day and filmed the entire act.”  Id.  The 
resulting film clip was approximately 15 seconds long (the length of the performer’s entire act) and was 
shown on the 11 o’clock news program that night.  Id.  The plaintiff then sued the broadcasting company 
in state court, alleging an “unlawful appropriation” of his “professional property.”  Id.  This case is the 
only right of publicity case taken by the Supreme Court.  Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone 
Wrong: A Case for Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 232 
(1994). 
 34. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575. 
 35. Id. at 575–76. 
 36. Id. at 576. 
 37. Id. at 578. 
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recognized the existence of the right of publicity, but also carved out the 
“newsworthy” exception to the right.38 
Currently, nineteen states recognize the right of publicity via statute,39 
and the right exists by common law in many states that have not 
legislatively defined the right.40  The variations between state right of 
publicity laws have generated scholarly debate over whether a federal 
right of publicity statute would be beneficial.41  The Patent, Trademark 
and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association has 
occasionally explored federalization of the right of publicity.  Due to 
parallels with trademark law, some have proposed that the proper place 
to create a federal right of publicity is within the federal trademark 
statute, commonly known as the Lanham Act.42  Nevertheless, efforts to 
federalize the right of publicity have broken down under the strains of 
competing interests.43 
2. Policy Justifications for the Right of Publicity 
There are several policy justifications for having a right of publicity.  
First, there is a natural rights argument that “[e]ach and every human 
should be given control over the use of his or her identity” simply 
because it is his or her identity.44  This view “posits that a right of 
publicity should be protected the same as any other property right,” 
meaning that “the identifiable aspects of a person’s identity or ‘persona’ 
should be legally recognized as the person’s ‘property,’ protectable 
against unpermitted commercial use.”45  Closely related to the natural 
rights argument is the right of “autonomous self-definition,” which 
argues that “the right of publicity prevents unauthorized commercial 
 38. Id. at 574–75, 578 (stating that the right of publicity does not prevent the media from 
reporting “newsworthy facts” about the plaintiff’s act, but clarifying that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution do not immunize the media when broadcasting a “performer’s entire 
act without his consent”). 
 39. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 6:8. The states that have recognized the right of publicity via 
statute are: CA, FL, IN, IL, KY, MA, NY, NE, NV, OH, OK, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, and WI. 
 40. Id.  The states in which the courts have recognized a common law right of publicity are: AZ, 
AL, CA, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, MI, MN, MO, NH, NJ, OH, PA, TX, UT, WV, and WI. 
 41. See Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals 
to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998). 
 42. Id. at 209–10.  However, the Lanham Act may not be the optimal place for a federal right of 
publicity for the simple reason that causes of action under the Act are limited to some form of falsity, 
while infringement of the right of publicity involves no element of falsity.  5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:14 (4th ed. 2010). 
 43. See Symposium, supra note 41, at 209–10. 
 44. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:1. 
 45. Id. § 2:2. 
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uses of a person’s identity that interfere with meanings and values that 
the public associates with that person.”46  In other words, people should 
have the right to control their identity because it’s theirs, and because it 
belongs to them, they should have the right to control the way it is 
perceived by others. 
There are also several economic policy reasons for having a right of 
publicity.  The incentive justification suggests that certain persons 
should be given an economic incentive to engage in the socially 
beneficial activity of entering the public eye.  Since a person must 
sacrifice some amount of privacy to be in the public eye, in return they 
should have the opportunity to gain from the marketable value of their 
identity.47  There is also a micro-economic-based justification for a right 
of publicity, which recognizes the principle that “granting individuals 
exclusive rights to property is an effective way of allocating scarce 
resources.”48  Thus “granting a property right in a person’s identity will 
result in the best and most efficient use of a person’s name and 
likeness.”49  Lastly, there is the argument that the right of publicity can 
be justified by the need to prevent fraudulent business practices—
namely falsity in business promotions such as product endorsements and 
product tie-ins.50  This theory is based on the assumption that many 
commercial uses of a person’s identity contain false representations 
regarding a person’s endorsement of the product.  Such 
misrepresentations injure the person featured in the endorsement by 
associating him or her with a product or service he or she does not 
actually support and injures the consuming public by misleading claims 
of endorsement.51 
Because the right of publicity is based on a person’s commercial 
value and many of the policy reasons behind the right focus on 
economic considerations, many right of publicity cases deal with 
 46. Id. § 2.9 (citing M.P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005)). 
 47. Id. § 2:6. 
 48. Id. § 2:7; Richard A. Posner, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 
393, 411 (1978) [hereinafter Posner, Right of Privacy]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW § 3.3 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
 49. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:7.  See also Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 48, at 411; 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 48, § 3.3. 
 50. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2.8; Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity 
and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1600 (1979). 
 51. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2.8.  The right of publicity is often invoked in the context of 
commercial speech when the appropriation of a celebrity likeness creates a false and misleading 
impression that the celebrity is endorsing a product.  See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th 
Cir.1992); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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celebrities.52  In fact, while the majority view is that the right of 
publicity is an inherent right for everyone, including non-celebrities, a 
minority view concludes only “celebrities” have a right of publicity.53  It 
has been argued that the right should only attach to those who 
“consciously seek pecuniary reward from the exploitation of the 
publicity value of their names and likenesses.”54  Conversely, those who 
believe “everyone has a right of publicity” believe that “[w]hile a 
celebrity’s right of publicity will usually have a greater economic value 
than that of a non-celebrity, this governs only the amount of damages, 
not the very existence of the right.”55  Many “courts use the 
commonsense rule that if a defendant uses [the] plaintiff’s personal 
identity for commercial purposes, then it will be presumed that 
plaintiff’s identity had commercial value.”56 
3. Bringing a Cause of Action for Misappropriation of the Right of 
Publicity 
When the commercial interest in a person’s identity is infringed upon, 
the resulting claim for restitution is misappropriation of the right of 
publicity, a commercial tort of unfair competition.57  In order to 
establish this cause of action, plaintiffs must prove (1) the validity of 
their right of publicity; and (2) that this right has been infringed upon by 
the defendant.58 
There are currently two tests used to establish this cause of action.  
Under common law, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: 
“(1) the defendant used plaintiff’s identity or persona; (2) the 
appropriation of the persona was for the defendant’s commercial 
advantage; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the use [of his or her 
identity]; and (4) the use is likely to cause an injury to [the] plaintiff.”59  
Currently, however, more courts follow a two-pronged test, which 
requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the “[d]efendant, without 
permission, has used some aspect of identity or persona in such a way 
that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant’s use;” and (2) 
 52. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 4:2. 
 53. Id. §§ 4:15, 4:16. 
 54. Id. § 4:15. 
 55. Id. § 4:14. 
 56. Id. § 4:17. 
 57. Id. § 3:1. 
 58. Id. § 3:2 (citing Prima v. Darden Rest., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000)). 
 59. Thomas Phillip Boggess V, Cause of Action for an Infringement on the Right of Publicity, in 
31 CAUSES OF ACTION 121, §§ 6–13 (2d ed. 2006).  See also Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
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“[d]efendant’s use is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of 
that persona.”60 
The first prong of the two-prong test has three sub-elements; the 
plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant (1) without consent (2) 
used a characteristic of the plaintiff’s identity in a manner from which 
(3) plaintiff was identifiable.61  The first sub-element, whether the 
plaintiff consented to the defendant’s use of his or her image, is usually 
a straightforward issue easily determined by the courts.62  After lack of 
consent is established, a plaintiff must prove that some aspect of his or 
her identity was used.63  Most right of publicity cases involve the use of 
a plaintiff’s distinguishable name, photograph, or likeness.64  With 
respect to the third sub-element, the law has not yet developed a clear-
cut definition of “identifiability”; although it is clear, the use of the 
plaintiff’s name, image, or likeness must be more than an incidental or 
coincidental similarity.65 
Plaintiffs must show that a defendant, without permission, used some 
aspect of their identity or persona in such a way that they are 
identifiable.  Once this showing is made, plaintiffs must still 
demonstrate that the defendant used their persona for commercial or 
trade purposes in a manner that would likely cause damage to their 
commercial value.66  A classic example of the use of an individual’s 
identity or persona for trade purposes is the use of the individual’s 
likeness to advertise the defendant’s goods or services.67  Determining 
the commercial status of the defendant’s use often involves balancing 
the right of publicity against the broader right of free speech provided by 
 60. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 3:2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Minora, supra note 12, at 855–56 (“On the whole, whether the plaintiff consented to the 
defendant’s use of his or her image is a clear-cut issue and easily determined by the trier of fact.”); 
Boggess, supra note 59, § 12 (“Typically, the issue as to whether there was consent is obvious.”). 
 63. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 4:46. 
 64. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 304 (D.N.H. 2008) 
(Image); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Portrait); Beverly v. Choices 
Women’s Med. Ctr. Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1981) (Image); Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 
F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–95 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (Name). 
 65. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95 (“there are many ways a plaintiff can be identified in a 
defendant’s use” and plaintiff’s identifiability “will probably not be a disputable issue in the majority of 
meritorious [r]ight of [p]ublicity cases.” (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS of PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 3:2 (1998))).  See also, e.g., Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 
1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding plaintiff not identified by the similarity in name between the 
plaintiff, a famous sculptor, and the defendant’s creation of the same name, a television character in a 
fictional police drama). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 49 (1995). 
 67. Id. § 47. 
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the First Amendment.68  For instance, “the use of a person’s identity in 
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or 
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses” is not 
ordinarily an infringement of the right of publicity,69 precluding a 
finding of commercial damage.  Therefore, an individual’s right of 
publicity is often found to be more valuable than commercial speech and 
less valuable than informative or political speech.70 
The right of publicity blossomed as a separate legal theory when the 
right of privacy failed to protect celebrity plaintiffs.  Today, the right of 
publicity is generally recognized as an intellectual property right 
belonging to everyone.  The majority of states and the Supreme Court 
have recognized the right of publicity as a legitimate legal theory.  There 
are several key public policy reasons for recognizing a person’s right of 
publicity.  Everyone should have the right to protect their commercial 
identity and the way their identity is perceived by the public.  
Furthermore, those who sacrifice their privacy to be in the public eye 
should have the opportunity to gain from the marketable value of their 
identity and to allocate the use of their identity in the public to maintain 
its value.  Allowing persons to protect and manage their commercial 
identity also limits the amount of fraudulent business practices in 
advertising and related fields.  Today, if potential plaintiffs can prove 
that some aspect of their identity has been used without their permission 
in a way that is likely to cause damage to their commercial value, they 
 68. See Boggess, supra note 59, § 19.  “The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects 
certain types of speech.  Of all the different areas of speech, ‘commercial speech’ has the lowest level of 
protection under the First Amendment.”  Id. (citing Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 911 
(Mich. 1948); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)).  “Any speech that 
has as its focus imploring the audience to buy a product or service is labeled commercial speech for First 
Amendment purposes.”  Id. (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18).  “In cases where the 
speech is purely commercial, the right of publicity will often trump any free speech claim the defendant 
may make.”  Id. (citing Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Winter v. 
DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995). 
 70. Comedy III Prod., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001). 
[T]he right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a right to control 
the celebrity’s image by censoring disagreeable portrayals.  Once the celebrity thrusts 
himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the right 
to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity image 
must be given broad scope.  The necessary implication of this observation is that the right 
of publicity is essentially an economic right.  What the right of publicity holder possesses 
is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the 
economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame through the merchandising of the 
‘name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness’ of the celebrity. 
Id. 
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will have a valid cause of action.  The existence of the right of publicity 
cause of action gives potential plaintiffs a chance to manage their 
identity in the eyes of the public and to protect themselves from any use 
of their name, image, or likeness that serves to erode the commercial 
value of that identity. 
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
CLAIMS UNDER § 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Currently, federal circuits have taken differing approaches regarding 
the scope of immunity provided by § 230 of the CDA in relation to 
misappropriation of the right of publicity claims.  The Ninth Circuit has 
held that a claim for the misappropriation of the right of publicity is 
barred by § 230 based on policy reasons.  In contrast, within the First 
Circuit, the District Court of New Hampshire, accepted the 
characterization of the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort as 
an invasion of an intellectual property right and has held that a right of 
publicity claim is exempt from CDA immunity.  Meanwhile, the 
Eleventh Circuit avoided making a concrete ruling on whether right of 
publicity claims are exempt under § 230.  Because the Supreme Court 
has yet to rule on the exact scope of what constitutes intellectual 
property under § 230, it is unlikely that the circuits will reach a 
consensus on how the right of publicity should be treated under the 
statute. 
A. Public Policy Counts: The Ninth Circuit in Carafano v. Metrosplash 
and Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill, LLC 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken an expansive view of 
the immunization given by § 230, adopting the viewpoint that only 
federal intellectual property claims such as copyright and trademark 
infringement are exempt from CDA immunity.  In Carafano v. 
Metrosplash, a case involving “cruel and sadistic identity theft,” the 
Ninth Circuit held that a computer match-making service was statutorily 
immune under § 230 from claims stemming from the posting of false 
content in a dating profile provided by someone posing as another 
person.71  Carafano was a popular actress, who appeared in numerous 
films and television shows under the stage name Chase Masterson.72  An 
unknown person using a computer in Berlin posted a trial personal 
 71. Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 72. Id. at 1121.  Carafano has appeared on “Star Trek: Deep Space Nine” and “General 
Hospital.” 
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profile of Carafano on Matchmaker.com under the identifier 
“Chase529.”73  The profile featured her picture, listed the movies she 
appeared in, and provided her home address.74  As a result of the 
improper posting, Carafano began to receive threatening and sexually 
explicit messages.75  She filed a complaint in California state court 
against Matchmaker.com and its corporate successors, alleging 
misappropriation of the right of publicity.76 
The Ninth Circuit focused on the policy reasons for enacting the 
CDA, which gave most Internet service providers immunity from 
publishing false or defamatory material so long as the information was 
provided by another party.77  The court felt that allowing tort liability 
would have a chilling effect on the large amount of information 
communicated via interactive computer services.78  Therefore, in order 
to uphold the speech-protective policy interests behind § 230, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that all of Carafano’s claims 
were barred by the CDA.79 
In reaching that decision, the court focused on Congress’s reasons for 
enacting the CDA, promoting the free exchange of information and 
ideas over the Internet and encouraging voluntary monitoring for 
offensive material, and noted that reviewing courts have treated CDA 
immunity as “quite robust.”80  Under the “robust” view, courts have 
“adopt[ed] a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer 
 73. Id.  The profile stated that “Chase529” was “looking for a one-night stand” and sought a 
“hard and dominant” man with “a strong sexual appetite” and that she “liked sort of be[]ing controlled 
by a man, in and out of bed.”  Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1121–22.  Shortly after the posting, Carafano began received sexually explicit 
messages in her voicemail and a highly threatening and sexually explicit fax that also threatened her son.  
Feeling unsafe in her home, she and her son stayed in hotels away from her home in Los Angeles for a 
few months.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 1122.  “The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a 
published opinion.”  Id. 
 77. Id. at 1122–23.  The court notes that the text of § 230 itself notes that “interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,” 
and that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4), (5) (2006)).  
“Congress declared it the ‘policy of the United States’ to ‘promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services,’ ‘to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,’ and to ‘remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies.’”  Id. (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (4)). 
 78. Id. at 1124.  “Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, 
interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of 
messages posted.”  Id. 
 79. Id. at 1125. 
 80. Id. at 1122–23. 
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service’ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content 
provider,’” which allows an “interactive computer service” to “qualif[y] 
for immunity so long as it does not also function as an ‘information 
content provider’ for the portion of the statement or publication at 
issue.”81  Under this type of analysis, the court found that 
“Matchmaker[.com] [could not] be considered an ‘information content 
provider,’” despite the fact that some of the content was formulated in 
response to Matchmaker.com’s questionnaire, “because no profile has 
any content until a user actively creates it.”82  Likewise, the court held 
that the fact that Matchmaker.com classifies characteristics into 
categories and collects answers to essay questions does not transform 
Matchmaker.com into the developer of the information.83  The Ninth 
Circuit went on to say that even if Matchmaker could be considered an 
“information content provider,” § 230(c)(1) precludes treatment as a 
publisher or speaker for “any information provided by another 
information content provider.”84  Therefore, the statute would still bar 
Carafano’s claims unless Matchmaker.com created or developed the 
particular content at issue; because the court found that 
Matchmaker.com did not play a significant role in creating, developing 
or “transforming” the content in question, they could not be found 
liable.85 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill LLC, the Ninth Circuit explicitly defined 
the scope of immunization provided by the CDA, holding that the CDA 
immunized interactive computer service providers from state intellectual 
property claims, including the misappropriation of the right of publicity, 
on policy grounds.86  The court said that state laws protecting 
intellectual property lacked uniformity and “may bear various names, 
provide for varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying 
purposes and policy goals.”87  Because material on a website may be 
viewed in more than one state at a time, the court believed that allowing 
any particular state’s definition of intellectual property to dictate the 
boundaries of federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s 
 81. Id. at 1123. 
 82. Id. at 1124. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1125 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006)) (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007).  Perfect 10, the 
publisher of an adult entertainment magazine and the owner of the subscription website perfect10.com, 
alleges CCBill violated various intellectual property laws, including, inter alia, right of publicity laws, 
by providing services to websites that posted images stolen from Perfect 10’s magazines and websites.  
Id. at 1108. 
 87. Id. at 1118. 
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expressed goal of protecting the development of the internet from 
different state-law systems88  The Ninth Circuit construed the term 
“intellectual property” to mean “federal intellectual property.”89 
The Ninth Circuit has generally taken an expansive view of the scope 
of § 230’s immunity, finding a plaintiff’s claim for the misappropriation 
of the right of publicity barred in two cases.  Perfect 10, Inc. clarified 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Carafano by expressly holding that all 
state intellectual property claims, including the misappropriation of the 
right of publicity, are not subject to the § 230(e)(2) exception. 
B. Literal Statutory Interpretation: The First Circuit in Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network 
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, the District Court of New Hampshire 
reached the opposite conclusion than the Ninth Circuit.  In Friendfinder 
Network, an unknown person created a female profile with the screen 
name “petra03755” on “AdultFriendFinder.com,” which described itself 
as the “the World’s Largest SEX and SWINGER Personal 
Community.”90  The profile identified the plaintiff as a recently 
separated 40-year old woman living in New Hampshire.91  The plaintiff 
claimed that the biographic information and photograph on the website 
identified her as “petra03755.”92  The plaintiff requested the website 
operator to remove the profile, which it did.93  However, “the profile 
allegedly continued to appear, with slight modifications, on other similar 
websites operated by the defendants,” and “as ‘teasers’ on Internet 
search engines and advertisements on other third-party websites, 
including ‘sexually related’ ones.”94  The plaintiff ultimately sued the 
website operator for a variety of claims including “[i]nvasion of 
[p]roperty/[i]ntellectual [p]roperty [r]ights” equivalent to the 
misappropriation of the right of publicity.95 
 88. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a), (b) (2006)). 
 89. Id. at 1119.  The court in Perfect 10 is interpreting the § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, which 
requires the court to construe § 230(c)(1) in a manner that would neither “limit [n]or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
 90. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 291–92 (D.N.H. 2008). 
 91. Id. at 292. 
 92. Id.  The profile included information on her sexual proclivities, birth date, height, build, hair 
and eye color, and an apparently digitally altered nude photograph.  Id.  The plaintiff learned of the 
profile more than a year after it was posted from an acquaintance who had been discussing it with other 
members of the plaintiff’s circle who believed the profile to be the plaintiff’s.  Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  The plaintiff claimed that “these teasers and advertisements served to direct Internet 
traffic to the defendants’ own websites, allegedly increasing their profitability.”  Id. at 293. 
 95. Id. 
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The district court accepted the plaintiff’s characterization of the 
misappropriation of the right of publicity tort as an invasion of an 
intellectual property right, meaning that the tort was exempt from CDA 
immunity.96  In reaching this decision, the court relied on dicta from the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The First Circuit stated, in a case 
regarding Florida’s trademark dilution statute, that “[c]laims based on 
intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 230 immunity.”97  
The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s limitation on the definition of 
intellectual property to only include “federal intellectual property,” 
noting that other courts have joined the First Circuit in assuming that 
§ 230(e)(2) excepts state as well as federal intellectual property laws.98 
The District Court of New Hampshire’s finding that intellectual 
property law includes both state and federal intellectual property law is 
based on an strict interpretation of the language of § 230(e)(2).  Citing 
First Circuit precedent, the court noted that “[s]tatutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute” and where the language of the 
statute  is clear and unambiguous there is no need for further inquiry.99  
Because the language of § 230(e)(2) simply states that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law relating to 
intellectual property,” and because the Supreme Court has noted that 
“the modifier ‘any’ amounts to ‘expansive language [that] offers no 
indication whatsoever that Congress intended [a] limiting construction,’” 
the district court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that intellectual 
property under § 230 was limited to federal intellectual property.100  The 
court also rejected the Perfect 10 court’s argument regarding the effect 
of state law on the manageability of the CDA, stating that they had no 
reason to believe that a reading of the statute “to exempt state 
intellectual property law would place any materially greater burden on 
service providers than they face by having to comply with federal 
intellectual property law.”101 
 96. Id. at 303. 
 97. Id. at 298 (citing Universal Comm’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422–23 (1st Cir. 
2007)).  Universal Comm’n Sys. was decided on an appeal from the Massachusetts district court.  
Defendant Lycos is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts.  
Plaintiff Universal Communications Systems is a Nevada Corporation with its principal place of 
business in Florida.  Universal Conm’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 414. 
 98. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299.  See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 
1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006); Gucci Am., Inc., v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 99. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (citing Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding 
Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989))). 
 100. Id. (citing Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)). 
 101. Id. at 301.  The court stated that “neither the Ninth Circuit nor the defendants offered a single 
example of how ‘any particular states definition of intellectual property,’ meaningfully enlarges its 
17
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Relying on First Circuit precedent interpreting § 230(e)(2) to exempt 
state as well as federal intellectual property claims from the scope of the 
Act’s immunity provision and Supreme Court statutory interpretation 
precedent interpreting “any” to have an expansive meaning, the District 
Court of New Hampshire, in Doe v. Friendfinder Network, accepted the 
plaintiff’s characterization of the misappropriation of the right of 
publicity claim as an invasion of an intellectual property right and 
exempted the claim from § 230’s immunity provision. 
C. Dodging the Issue: The Eleventh Circuit in Almeida v. Amazon.com 
In Almeida v. Amazon.com, a woman who, as a minor, was 
photographed for an artistic exhibit with her mother’s consent brought 
an action against Amazon.com, Inc. for displaying her image on its 
websites in furtherance of its sale of the book Anjos Proibidos 
(“Forbidden Angels”), asserting right of publicity claims under Florida’s 
commercial misappropriation statute.102  The plaintiff did not consent to 
the use of her picture and did not receive compensation for the use of her 
image.103 
When faced with the issue of whether the CDA preempts right of 
publicity claims, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “there appears to be no 
dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property 
right.”104  The court seemed to agree with the plaintiff’s argument that 
the right of publicity is a widely recognized intellectual property 
right.105  However, even though the court agreed with the plaintiff that 
the district court should have addressed § 230(e)(2) before invoking the 
CDA’s grant of immunity, the court also failed to address the issue, 
protections beyond those conferred by federal law, or how intellectual property regimes ‘vary widely 
from state to state’ in substance.”  Id. 
 102. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1318–19.  Anjos Proibidos is a photographic book displaying black and 
white photographs of girls between the ages of ten and seventeen.  Id.  The photographer and the book’s 
publisher were prosecuted for creating a work of child pornography and were acquitted.  Id.  Originally 
the Plaintiff Almeida was featured inside of the First Edition of the book that was approved by her 
mother.  Id.  However, in 2000, a second edition was published where her picture was featured on the 
book’s cover.  Id.  It was the Second Edition that was offered for sale on Amazon’s website.  Id. 
 103. Id. at 1318. 
 104. Id. at 1323. 
 105. Id. at 1322.  The court cited several sources that recognize the right of publicity as an 
intellectual property right: ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ’g. Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the right 
of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right 
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity”); Allison v. Vintage Sports 
Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (the common law right of publicity is an intellectual property right for 
purposes of the first-sale doctrine); and J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer & the Rights of 
Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA. L. REV. 1703, 1712 (1987) (the right of publicity has “matured into a 
distinctive legal category occupying an important place in the law of intellectual property”). 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/10
SPEARS FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  4:19:53 PM 
2010] STRANGERS WITH OUR FACES 427 
t of publicity claims. 
 
stating that regardless of the answer, “the district court did not need to 
address the difficult issues of application of the CDA under the facts of 
this case.”106  The court held that since the plaintiff’s right of publicity 
claim would not withstand a motion to dismiss under the law, it was 
unnecessary for the district court to determine whether the CDA 
preempts a state law right of publicity claim.107  Despite the Eleventh 
Circuit’s recognition of the right of publicity as an intellectual property 
right, the court refused to infer that as an intellectual property right, right 
of publicity claims should be exempted from § 230 immunity.  
Therefore, a split among federal circuits interpreting § 230(e)(2) still 
exists.  The Ninth Circuit held that the term intellectual property only 
encompasses federal intellectual property for purposes of the statute, 
whereas the District Court of New Hampshire, relying on First Circuit 
precedent, concluded that § 230(e)(2) encompasses both state and 
federal intellectual property claims resulting in an exemption from § 230 
immunity for righ
The circuit courts have been unable to reach a consensus regarding 
the treatment of the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort under 
§ 230.  The CDA has been broadly interpreted to provide immunity for 
operators and users of interactive computer services, who publish 
information provided by a third party, from even the most egregious of 
torts against individuals.108  However, § 230(e)(2) requires courts to 
construe the CDA in a manner that would neither limit nor expand any 
law pertaining to intellectual property.109  As a result, federal courts 
appear to be split on exactly how to characterize misappropriation of the 
right of publicity.  The Ninth Circuit, viewing misappropriation of the 
right of publicity from the tort perspective, found that the claim was 
barred under the CDA.110  Conversely, the District Court of New 
Hampshire viewed the plaintiff’s misappropriation of the right of 
publicity claim as an intellectual property claim that was exempt from 
CDA immunity.111  The Eleventh Circuit chose to decide the issue on 
other grounds.112  Therefore, clarification in the law is necessary to 
ensure that all plaintiffs with right of publicity claims receive his or her 
day in court. 
 106. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
 110. Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 111. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008). 
 112. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In resolving the question as to whether the § 230(e)(2) intellectual 
property exemption applies to right of publicity claims, this Part 
addresses the right of publicity’s traditional characterization as an 
intellectual property right and why its status as a state law doctrine 
should have no effect on this classification.  This Part then addresses 
why the strict statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2) favors the exclusion 
of right of publicity claims from § 230’s statutory immunity and how the 
language of § 230(e)(2) could be further clarified.  Finally, this Part 
illustrates how allowing right of publicity claims despite § 230 
immunity furthers the policy reasons behind right of publicity law and 
does not harm the policy interests promoted by Congress in enacting 
§ 230. 
A. The Right of Publicity as a Traditional Intellectual Property Right 
The right of publicity is traditionally a state law claim, and is 
traditionally considered an intellectual property issue.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary explicitly lists publicity rights as a recognized category of 
intellectual property as well as other traditional state law doctrines such 
as trade-secret rights and rights against unfair competition.113  
Furthermore, publicity rights serve a purpose similar to traditional 
intellectual property rights.  The state’s interest in providing a right of 
publicity is “closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, 
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”114  While patent and copyright law protects the endeavors of 
authors and inventors in creating valuable writings and inventions,115 the 
right of publicity similarly protects the endeavors of those who develop 
the marketable value of their identity. 
Despite its traditional characterization as a member of the intellectual 
property law family, there has been some argument that since it is 
traditionally a state-law claim it should be treated differently.  However, 
right of publicity case law is relatively similar throughout the states, and 
 113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999) (defining intellectual property as “[a] 
category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect.  The 
category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also includes trade-secret 
rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against unfair competition”). 
 114. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1323 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 
(1977)). 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
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attempts to federalize the doctrine illustrate that the right of publicity is a 
doctrine of enough significance to be codified along with its more 
famous cousins copyright, trademark and patent.116 
B. Strict Literal Interpretation of § 230(e)(2) 
The strict literal statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2) supports the 
argument that right of publicity claims should be allowed despite the 
§ 230 immunity provided to other tort claims not related to intellectual 
property.  The language of § 230(e)(2) itself does not suggest a 
limitation to federal intellectual property, but simply states that “nothing 
in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.”117  The word “any” is interpreted broadly, 
indicating that Congress did not intend a narrow construction of the 
statutory language.118  Furthermore, Congress has expressly used the 
words “federal” and “state” elsewhere in the statute when its intent was 
to limit the scope of the statutory provision.119  Section 230(e)(1) states 
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of [named federal criminal statutes] or any other Federal 
criminal statute” and § 230(e)(3) states that “[n]othing in this section 
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that 
is consistent with the section.”120  The content of § 230(e)(1) and § 230 
(e)(3) illustrates that “where Congress wished to distinguish between 
state and federal law in § 230, it knew how to do so.”121  It follows that 
the use of “any” in § 230(e)(2) in contrast to the use of “federal” 
elsewhere in the statute suggests that Congress did not intend for “any” 
to be interpreted as interchangeable with “federal.”  “‘Where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress . . . intentionally’” makes such decisions.122 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to recover damages for the 
misappropriation of the right of publicity because Congress did not 
intend any sort of limiting construction and because the right of 
 116. See Symposium, supra note 41. 
 117. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006). 
 118. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008) (quoting Harrison v. 
PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980)). 
 119. Id. at 299–300. 
 120. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), (3). 
 121. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (citing Voicenet Commn’s, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 
04-1318, 2006 WL 2506318, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006)). 
 122. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 
29–30 (1997)). 
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publicity is a widely accepted intellectual property right.  A state 
law/federal law distinction cannot be discerned from the face of the 
statute, and therefore, should not cause right of publicity claims to be 
treated differently from their more well-known intellectual property 
cousins. 
C. The Need for Statutory Clarification of § 230(e)(2) 
Despite § 230(e)(2)’s clear language, some courts, citing public 
policy concerns, still believe that a distinction should be made based on 
the right of publicity’s status as a state law claim.  In order to encourage 
the strict literal interpretation of the statute in circuits that are 
proponents of enforcing the public policy reasons for the passage of 
§ 230, a possible solution may be for the legislature to amend the statute 
to include an express definition of “intellectual property,” and to make 
clear that the right of publicity falls within that definition. 
To further emphasize Congress’ intent to exempt all forms of 
intellectual property, both state and federal, from the scope of CDA 
immunity, Congress could amend § 230(e)(2) to include an express 
definition of intellectual property.  The new statutory definition of 
intellectual property could possibly be based on the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition, defining “intellectual property” as “a category of 
intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the 
human intellect, including both state and federally created rights.”123 
Expressly defining intellectual property to include both state and 
federal law should eliminate any split among the circuits regarding 
whether the right of publicity is intellectual property.  However, to 
ensure the right of publicity’s protection under § 230(e)(2), an express 
listing of all categories of intellectual property exempted from CDA 
immunity under the statute should be added to the statutory definition of 
intellectual property.  For example, the statute could read, “intellectual 
property includes, but is not limited to: trademarks, copyrights, patents, 
trade-secrets, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against unfair 
competition.”124  If the right of publicity is expressly listed as an 
included category, courts will have to follow the explicit, plain language 
of the statute. 
 123. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999). 
 124. See id. 
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D. The Public Policy Benefits of Exempting Right of Publicity Claims 
from § 230 Immunity 
Despite the fact that the clear language of the statute supports 
exempting the right of publicity from CDA immunity, there are 
competing policy concerns regarding the protection of internet content 
providers from the floodgates of tort litigation, the prevention of the 
chilling of valuable free speech over the Internet and the maintenance of 
voluntary monitoring of offensive material.  However, the policy 
reasons for having a right of publicity are equally compelling, and 
arguably, the natural right of every human being to control their image 
and likeness, self-definition, and their personal economic interests 
should be balanced against the natural right of a person’s free speech.  
Allowing right of publicity claims does not necessarily hinder 
Congress’s policy interests in passing § 230 and can further the goals of 
having a right of publicity. 
1. Exempting Misappropriation of the Right of Publicity Claims from 
§ 230 Immunity Promotes the Policy Goals of the State Right of 
Publicity Policy 
Allowing claims for the misappropriation of the right of publicity to 
be exempt from § 230 immunity furthers the public policy goals of 
allowing persons to possess a right of publicity.  First, exempting right 
of publicity claims from CDA immunity supports the natural rights and 
autonomous self-determination justifications for a right of publicity.  
Following the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in barring such claims, deprives 
potential plaintiffs of the right to control what is rightfully theirs—
namely their identity and public perception of that identity.  Conversely, 
allowing right of publicity claims gives potential plaintiffs a way to 
protect their identity and others’ perception of it by creating a cause of 
action against those owners and operators of interactive computer 
services that allowed false information about the victim to be posted on 
their websites. 
Furthermore, following Ninth Circuit precedent would deprive 
potential plaintiffs of possible opportunities to benefit from their 
identity’s marketable value and would erode the potential marketable 
value of their identity.  For example, having one’s identity associated 
with suggestive dialogue and questionable sexual activities could ruin an 
individual’s reputation, resulting in loss of employment or hindrance in 
finding new job opportunities.  Allowing a potential plaintiff to bring 
claims for the misappropriation of the right of publicity against operators 
and users of interactive computer services provides an extra level of 
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protection against unfair damage to an individual’s commercial value. 
Another justification for the right of publicity is that it helps protect 
against fraudulent business practices.  However, barring right of 
publicity claims under the CDA would only serve to encourage unfair 
business practices on the part of internet service providers.  For 
example, in Doe v. Friendfinder Network Inc., one of the plaintiff’s 
complaints centered around the fact that AdultFriendFinder.com caused 
portions of the “petra03755” profile to appear as “teasers” on internet 
search engines and as advertisements on other third party websites, 
including “sexually related ones.”125  If the District Court of New 
Hampshire had followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead, the plaintiff would 
have no redress against this unfair use of the commercial value of her 
identity.  In order to protect plaintiffs from being associated with 
products or services they do not support and prevent consumers from 
being misled, claims for misappropriation of the right of publicity 
should be allowed in order to prevent deceptive practices. 
2. Exempting Misappropriation of the Right of Publicity Claims from 
§ 230 Immunity Preserves the Policy Goals of Congress’s Legislative 
Intent 
In addition to furthering the policy goals of the right of publicity, 
allowing misappropriation of the right of publicity claims under § 230 
will preserve Congress’s policy goals.  The free exchange of information 
over the internet will not be curtailed by preventing internet service 
providers from allowing third party content providers to post false and 
defamatory material about persons whose identity they have usurped.  If 
anything, protecting the commercial identity of such persons should 
increase the amount of truthful speech available on the internet, which is 
arguably more beneficial to the public than having large amounts of 
false material on the internet.  Even though free speech is a natural right 
recognized by the Founders as being constitutionally protectable, courts 
have found that certain types of speech, such as defamation, obscenity, 
and subversive speech, are less deserving of First Amendment protection 
because they are of little social benefit and harm the individual rights of 
others.126  Arguably, allowing third parties to take others’ identities and 
 125. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
 126. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.5 (1985).  The 
Supreme Court recognized that all speech is not of equal First Amendment importance and offered 
several examples of speech which has historically been accorded no protection at all, including obscene 
speech, fighting words, speech advocating the violent overthrow of the government, and certain kinds of 
commercial speech.  See id.  See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
(recognizing defamation as a historically regulated category). 
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publish false statements about such persons has little social benefit and 
can be very damaging to the commercial value of people’s identity.  
Commercial speech is another area of limited First Amendment 
protection.127  Since right of publicity claims often involve the unfair 
commercial use of one’s identity, it seems to do no harm to goals of free 
speech to limit harmful speech in the commercial context.  Just as false 
information in advertising is not protected, false information about a 
person, who has a valuable commercial identity, should not be protected. 
Allowing right of publicity claims under § 230 will encourage 
voluntary monitoring of offensive material by providers and users of 
interactive computers services.  Such parties, knowing that they may still 
face liability for right of publicity claims under the statute, will have a 
greater incentive to continually monitor their sites for false postings.  
Many cases involving right of publicity claims involve plaintiffs who are 
concerned about the posting of sexually explicit content regarding 
themselves.  Therefore, monitoring for such false postings will aid the 
policy goal of protecting children from obscene materials. 
Right of publicity law developed to protect an individuals’ rights in 
their own identities, whereas § 230 was passed by Congress in order to 
protect the dissemination of free speech on the internet and the voluntary 
self-monitoring for offensive material by internet service providers.  
Despite their seeming opposition, both sets of public policy goals can be 
furthered by exempting right of publicity claims from § 230 immunity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, courts have interpreted § 230 of the CDA to provide 
immunity from tort liability to operators and users of interactive 
computer services who publish information provided by a third party.128  
However, circuits are in dispute regarding the scope of this immunity 
with respect to the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort.129  The 
Ninth Circuit has held that this claim is barred under § 230.130  
However, the District Court of New Hampshire has held that the First 
Circuit’s characterization of this tort as an intellectual property right 
 127. Because the First Amendment does not protect false and misleading commercial speech and 
because even non-misleading commercial speech is generally subject to somewhat lesser First 
Amendment protection, the right of publicity may often trump the right of advertisers to make use of 
celebrity figures.  Comedy III Prod., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (citing Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64, 566 (1980)). 
 128. See supra Part II.A. 
 129. See supra Part III. 
 130. See supra Part III.A. 
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precludes the application of CDA immunity.131  Section 230(e)(2) 
requires courts to construe the CDA in a manner that would neither limit 
nor expand any existing law relating to intellectual property.  There is 
general agreement that Congress meant to exclude federal intellectual 
property claims such as copyright and trademark, but there is debate 
over whether state-law claims, such as the right of publicity, are 
exempted from the broad immunity provided under the CDA.  The First 
Circuit’s approach, in treating even state-created intellectual property 
rights as exempted from CDA immunity under the language of 
§ 230(e)(2), is the approach most faithful to statutory interpretation, 
legal history, and public policy.  By allowing plaintiffs to bring 
misappropriation of the right of publicity claims, despite the immunity 
that § 230 gives to other tort claims, courts will protect victims of virtual 
identity
Perhaps, the most effective way to remedy the circuit split is to have 
the legislature clarify the language of § 230(e)(2) by including an 
express statutory definition of “intellectual property.”  By listing the 
right of publicity among the different types of intellectual property 
protected under § 230(e)(2), courts will be bound by the strict literal 
interpretation of the statute, resulting in uniform application of the law 
across the circuits. 
Think back to the hypothetical situation in the Introduction and 
imagine it is one year later.  Congress has passed an amendment to 
§ 230(e)(2) expressly listing the right of publicity as a protected 
intellectual property claim, exempt from § 230 immunity.  You now 
have a legitimate cause of action and may have your day in court to 
defend your reputation that was unfairly tarnished by a stranger who 
decided to post a false profile on the Internet featuring your name and 
likeness.  You now file a complaint listing a misappropriation of the 
right of publicity as grounds for recovery and your claim is not denied 
on a pre-trial motion.  After successfully litigating your claim, in 
addition to damages, your reputation is finally cleared and you can begin 
to rebuild the commercial value that you had lost. 
In the age of the internet, anyone could be the victim of a stranger 
who with access to a photo or biographical information, could convince 
the outside world that you are living a secret double life.  In order to 
prevent such “publicity stunts” and protect citizens against the unfair use 
of their commercial identity, reading § 230 (e)(2) to allow right of 
publicity claims could be a key first step in allowing citizens to take 
control of their lives and futures. 
 131. See supra Part III.B. 
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